DECLINE IN FAMILY SAVINGS RATE IN EUROPE: EXPLANATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES IN REGIONAL POLICY by Lera López, Fernando
1
40 Th. Congress of the European Regional Science Association
European Monetary Union and Regional Policy
Barcelona, Spain, 30th August- 2nd September , 2000
Decline in family savings rate in Europe: Explanations and consequences
in regional policy
Fernando Lera López
Department of Economics, Public University  of Navarre
Campus Arrosadía, s/n  C.P. 31015, Pamplone, Navarre, Spain.
Email: lera@unavarra.es , Phone: 34- 48-169705, Fax: 34- 48-169721
Abstract
The role which savings plays in the economy is beyond the scope of discussion.
Hence, the prolonged fall of the family savings rate has caused great worry in developed
countries. Thus, in the course of the last three decades the national savings relative to
income ratio has undergone profound changes, especially among the european
countries.
These changes have tended to run in the same direction for all countries, namely
down. In Spain, this situation is especially serious with falls beyond the family savings
rate. Also there is important differences among the european countries, with great
impact in the Regional Policy and the future of the European Monetary Union (E.M.U.).
Saving theories have tried to explain this fact, pointing out possible explanations,
a majority of them being provided by the Life Cycle Hypothesis, rather than the
altruism model. An analysis of the altruism model's explanations could offer additional
point of view in order to understand and avoid this situation which have important
consequences in the sustainable growth of the european countries who belong to the
E.M.U.
First, the paper presents evidence of the decline in the savings rates in U.S.A. and
Europe (with differences among countries). Second, it is presented evidence of the
importance of the different macroeconomics theories concerning the accumulation of
wealth by domestic economies.
Third, it is pointed out some explanations, provided by the Life Cycle Hypothesis.
Changes in family size, changes in the number of adult workers, mortality, and ageing
itself, for example, may systematically alter the marginal utility of consumption over
the life cycle and leaded to an optimal fall in consumption around retirement. In order to
offer other ideas, in the section five, some situations are provided by the altruism model.2
In section six, the analysis of saving is related to the process of convergence in
Europe and the consequences in terms of Regional Policy in the E.M.U. The differences
among countries and regions in the E.U. in converge, in a context of declining in saving,
could make more difficult the cohesion in terms of rates in economic growth in Europe.
1. Decline of savings
The evolution of total savings in the economy (national savings) is a result of the
behaviour of three principle classes of economic agents:  companies, families and
government.
Of these three components, the study of family savings has taken the most
distinguished place among them, not only because of its quantitative importance, rather
also for the greater reduction which, in comparison with other components of national
savings, had been experienced in the 80s.
1.1.  Evolution of savings at the global level, in USA and Europe
In the decades between 1950-1970 the growth of savings at a global level was
continuous and intense, presenting a maximum level in the 70s just during the time of
the two oil crises. At the root of the second oil crisis, savings rate fell drastically, such
that during the 80s and 90s it was at a much inferior average level in contrast to that of
the previous decades.
According to the IMF (1995a), the average global rate of savings in 1973-1980
represented 25% of GDP. This percentage was reduced to 22.5% in the period between
1981-1994. In 1992 and 1993, the global savings rate hardly reached the average of
21.75%.
Nevertheless, it is helpful to point out that savings behaviour has not been
homogenous throughout the world.  While in developing countries, the savings rates
have increased in the last decade, industrialised countries have shown a decline,
according to that gathered in IMF (1995b).
It may be helpful to illustrate the fact that in 1992-1993, China, Japan, and other
developing Asian economies composed 34% of world savings while their participation
in GDP was only 21%.  Industrialised countries participate in 35% of global savings,
compared to a GDP rated at 46%.
Studying U.S.A. and E.U., all measures of capital accumulation show a marked
downturns that starts in the 1980s and continues into the 1990s. For example, and
following Laibson (1997), U.S. personal savings as a percent of disposable personal
income fell from an average of 7.3 percent from 1946-1984 to an average of 5.3 percent
from 1985-1994. The 1985-1994 period had the lowest average saving rate of any ten-
year span in the post-war period.3
According to Gokhale et al. (1996), in the 1950, the rate of net national saving in
the United States was 12.3%. In 1994, it was only 3.5%. The U.S. saving rate averaged
9.1% per year in the 1950s and 1960s, 8.5% in the 1970s, 4.7% in the 1980s, and just
2.7% in the first five years of the 1990s.(1) Therefore, the data illustrate a dramatic long-
term decline in U.S. saving in the 1980s and 1990s. The fall in savings which has
happened at a global level is also expressed in the states of the European Union (Table
2).









1950-59 9.1 21.0 69.9 11.5
1960-69 9.1 22.1 68.8 11.7
1970-79 8.5 21.4 70.1 10.8
1980-89 4.7 21.3 74.0 5.9
1990-94 2.7 20.7 76.6 3.4
Source: Gokhale et al. (1996). Authors' calculation from the National Income and Product Accounts.
This fall is fundamentally concentrated in the 70s, while in the 80s a more reduced
level is established, going from 26.7% to 19% in the European Union, and from 27.3%
to 18% in Spain. After the years 1994 and 1995, savings in the European Union has
steadily increased. By breaking down gross national savings, it is evident that the fall is
fundamentally due to public savings. In effect, public savings experienced a decrease of
gross national savings of 7.4 percentage points in the European Union.













Spain E.U. Spain E.U. Spain E.U.
1970 27.3 26.7 4.0 5.2 23.3 21.5
1994 18.0 19.0 -2.4 -2.2 20.4 21.2
Difference -9.3 -7.7 -6.4 -7.4 -2.9 -0.3
Source: Raymond (1997).
In the case of the United States, the fall in the private savings rate was relatively
clear, the whole American society is saving generally less as gathered in Table 3.4
Table 3. Savings rates in the United States according to the Consumer Expenditure









+ 64 years Total
1972-73 9.5 12.1 16.8 22.9 14.9 15.1
1982-85 9.6 8.6 10.5 15.8 11.5 10.8
Difference 0.1 -3.5 -6.3 -7.1 -3.4 -4.3
Source: Bosworth, Burtless and Sabelhaus (1991).
1.2.  Evolution of savings in Spain
Although in Table 2 one observes the strong parallelism existent between the two
savings behaviours in Spain and in the states of the European Union, there exists a
series of characteristics which direct the study on the situation in Spain in greater detail.
In Table 4 one can more efficiently see the evolution of Gross Domestic Product and its
distinct components from 1964 to 1995, divided into three periods.
Thus, one can observe, as in recent decades, that gross national savings, as a
percentage of GDP, has decreased without interruption. In short, the fall in savings has
been 20.6%, caused in large by the abrupt fall in public savings (a decrease of 93.7%)
and secondly by the fall in family savings (a decrease of 30.5%).










(B - A) (C -B) [(C-
A)/A]*100
National Savings 26,2 22,3 20,8 -3,9 -1,5 -20,6
Public Savings 3,7 0,8 0,1 -2,9 -0,7 -97,3
Business Savings 11,7 12,2 13,2 0,5 1,0 12,8
Family Savings 10,8 9,4 7,5 -1,5 -1,8 -30,5
Source: Marchante (1997).
The causes of the fall in public savings have been the rapid growth in public
spending caused by the increase in transfers linked to the economic crisis of the 80s and
90s, just as by the extension and addition of unemployment and retirement loans.
In short, the increase in the size of the so called Welfare state, in its facet of
presenting social services and transfers, has been the cause of the fall in public savings.5
Nevertheless, that which has distinguished the Spanish economy from other
countries has been the percentage fall which represents the net savings of families in
GDP. This fall, including the interrupting character of such in the period between 1964
and 1973, has been greater than in other countries with a drop of 30.5% since 1964.
Table 5. Evolution of Savings in Spain (in percentage of National Income)
Years 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
National. 21,9 21,7 21,1 19,2 18,9 19,0 21,2 21,0 21,2 21,6
Private 19,6 20,0 19,8 18,4 20,7 20,6 23,7 21,9 20,2 19,4
Source: Author's elaboration from Bank of Spain (1999).
Table 6. Structure of National Savings in percentage of GDP.
National Savings
Years Families Public Enterprises
1970-74 11,07 3,38 12,69
1975-79 9,64 1,94 12,08
1980-84 8,50 -0,91 12,45
1985-89 7,33 0,89 13,44
1990 7,85 1,76 12,06
1991 8,53 1,28 11,18
1992 7,34 0,76 10,94
1993 9,48 -1,70 11,01
1994 7,38 -1,54 12,79
1995 8,99 -2,41 14,63
1996 8,44 -0,88 12,29
1997 7,67 0,88 12,58
1998 7,2 2,2 12,1
Source: Author's elaboration from InformesEconómicos98 , BBV (1999).
2. Importance of the theories concerning the households  savings
After presenting the decline of savings in USA, E.U. and Spain, especially in
households savings, a brief review is presented of the most important theories
concerning personal savings and variation of motives  in savings behaviour in families.
2.1. Life Cycle Theory
Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) developed the Life Cycle Hypothesis, based on
the assumption that people are not short-sighted and are able to make decisions in the
light of their entire life cycle.6
In this regard, it is assumed that individuals maximise the utility derived from
consumption throughout life, subject to budgetary restrictions, made dependent on the
amount of wealth they accumulate during their lifetime. Individuals, being aware that
once their productive life eventually ceases, their income will decrease considerably,
will save during those productive years in order to maintain a constant level of
consumption during retirement.
This entails a consumption function for every period which depends on current
income, future income, inherited and accumulated wealth, age and other variables,
including the agents’ preferences, interests rates, and so on. Yet, not only does current
income have a bearing on this, but also financial assets and inherited wealth.
Put in a simplified manner, the following consumption function shows these
variables:
C = a * R + b * Ye  ,                                                (1)
R being current income and Ye the expected income.
This model yields quite appealing results. First, an agent is found who is no longer
short-sighted, and is able to make optimum use of resources for a long period of time.
Moreover, this model surmises only one basic purpose for saving: the setting apart of
income with an aim to consume during the total life-cycle according to rational
planning.
Despite these appealing features, the Life Cycle model appears hampered by its
tendency to regard man as a rational subject and short-sighted, unable to see beyond his
own life, and restricted to act within its own confines. Yet, economic agents do not only
take care of themselves, but also of their families and of other fellow-human beings as
well. This fact explains the emergence of a new model, namely the intergenerational,
altruism or dynasty model, where relationships and transfers among generations play an
essential role.
2.2. Altruism model
The main distinctive feature setting apart this model, established by Barro (1974),
from the Life Cycle model, is the fact that its time frame is broader than the agent's
lifetime. Here the individual’s time frame includes his or her descendants and heirs. In
this context, bequests as well as private income transfers made during life play an
important role.
Following Patxot (1994), inheritance models based on altruism take the fact that
parents do care about their offspring’s well-being as its basic assumption. Therefore, the
parents' utility function must embody the children's utility function, deducted to a rate
denoted by the greek letter ß.
The utility function of the first generation, or generation 0, as it is named by the
author, would be:7
U0 = V(c0) + ß U1                                               (2)
where subscripts denote generation, and U is utility during the total life of the
individual. V(c0) would be utility derived from consumption, and ß U1, utility provided
by children's consumption. ß will be between zero and one, assuming that when perfect
altruism obtains, the resulting value will be one.
To sum up, here an agent is found who has a finite life, but one who holds an
infinite point of view with respect to consumption and utility. This fact makes the
altruistic agent very different from the Life Cycle agent.
2.3. Theories about precautionary savings
A four explanation about personal saving motives suggests that individuals save
for precautionary reasons. In trying to explain savings in old age, the Life Cycle model
has resorted to this reason as a possible explanation. Here, as in the Life Cycle model,
the temporal frame under consideration is restricted to the individual’s finite lifetime.
The precautionary model states that consumers try to optimise the intertemporal
distribution of consumption during their finite life. Nevertheless, and this is a new
condition, the agent faces different uncertainties during their lifetime (Deaton, 1992).
The most important or frequent uncertainties are considered to be: temporary
reduction of income due to unemployment, possible illness or labour handicaps, life-
span uncertainty, uncertainty caused by unexpected inflation, etc. These uncertainties
motivate individuals to save with an aim at providing some cover for themselves in case
of those eventualities/contingencies.
3. Explanations provided about the decline of savings
The presentation of these causes is not exhaustive. The majority of the causes
mentioned in the studies do not take into consideration the importance of the altruism
model. Following this tendency in other authors, we have found other possible causes
presented, such that all of them can explain the fall in savings rates and shed light on
their solutions.
3.1. The fall in growth and increase of public debt
Modigliani (1990), for example, uses data from 21 countries within the OECD
from the period of time between 1960 and 1987. Applying the cycle of life model, we
see that the least growth recently experienced in developed countries, together with the
public deficits in countries in which they have been incurred, explains, according to
Modigliani, the current fall in savings in OECD countries as well as in Spain.
Without neglecting the importance of these two variables, we have observed that
the emphasis which Modigliani puts on them as an explanation of the current situation
seems excessive. Modigliani’s argument is based on the fact that savings rates do not
change between age groups. He assumes that people who retire between 30 and 40 years8
of age will have the same spending patterns as the current retirees when the rhythm and
standard of living of both age groups have nothing to do with each other.
3.2  The effect of social security on savings rates
To assess the effect of the existing Social Security System on national saving, one
must recognise that social security affects public savings as well as private savings.
Although it is difficult to conclude something categorically, the existence of social
security can be considered as a, more or less perfect, substitute for private savings from
the provisional motive.
Barro (1974) argues that individuals who have operative utility-maximising
bequest motives offset fully the impact of social security wealth by increasing their
saving in order to compensate future generations for the tax burdens implied by the
social securities liabilities.
But, according to the position maintained by Feldstein (1974) in a pioneering
article, social security decreases, as it reduces, private savings. Answering to Barro,
Feldstein believes that an unknown number of individuals who are irrational or myopic
may not respond at all to the provision of social security benefits.
He obtains estimations from the aggregate data for the United States (Social
Security Bulletin) in the period between 1941 and 1946. The direct effect of the
existence of social security fully surpasses the anticipation of retirement. Therefore the
total effect is a sharp fall (by half) in private savings.  In a recent research, Feldstein
(1996) estimates that the existing social security wealth reduces overall private saving
by nearly 60 percent.
3.3. The contribution of wealth effects to the fall in savings
One determining factor in the decision to save has been seen to be the family
wealth variable. This factor has taken on greater importance in Spain since the second
half of the 1980s (Argandoña, 1995). The situation of the family and, in general, the
whole of the private sector, experienced a clear improvement in the 80s, in spite of the
fall in the stock market in 1988 by the bullish evolution of 1987 and 1988, which could
move to an increase in consumption and a fall in savings, just as predicted by the vital
cycle theory.
3.4. The development effect of financial markets
Borrowing restrictions, normally limited access to financial markets, have
complex effects on saving. The development and liberalisation of the financial markets
can facilitate falling into debt for those families that prefer it with greater ease than in
past years. Therefore, it is feasible to recognise a certain influence of this variable on
the fall in savings.9
The existing data seems to confirm these affirmations: the intensity of the process
of falling into debt of families in the 1980s coincides with the movement in favour of
greater liberalisation of financial markets in western countries.
 For example, Laibson (1997) suggests that financial innovation may have caused
the ongoing decline in U.S. savings rates, since financial innovation increases liquidity,
eliminating commitment opportunities. Following this author, the 1980s was a period of
rapid expansion in the U.S. consumer credit market. Increasing access to instantaneous
credit has reduced the effectiveness of commitment devices like illiquid assets. One
example of the expansion in instantaneous credit has been the growth in credit cards. In
1970, only 16 percent of all U.S. families had a third party credit card. By 1989, 54
percent had one.
3.5. The effect of an ageing population
According to Attanasio and Banks (1998), annual population growth, averaging
1.1% in the 1960s in the OECD, fell to 0.8% in the 1980s and is projected to slow down
to 0.2% by the 2020s. Fertility rates have fallen sharply in OECD countries, and are
project to stabilise only by 2025. Life expectancy will probably rise in most OECD
economies, by four to five years.
These trends imply ageing populations. This ageing population can explain,
according to the life-cycle supporters, a reduction in the savings rate. If age groups
which save the least or disave carry more weight in the society, aggregate savings
should decrease.
Nevertheless, it is not that clear that retirees do not save or save less, just as
shown by García-Durán (1992), Patxot (1994), Raymond et al. (1995), Lera (1997,
1999) and Garriga (1998) in Spain, Börsch-Supan (1993) in Germany, Danzinger et al.
(1983) in USA, Ando and Ferris (1988) in Italy and Japan, Schultz (1998) in Taiwan,
etc.
The explanation given by the OECD seems more plausible in that, possibly, the
most negative effect of an ageing population on a gross national savings rate is
produced not by the possible lesser savings rate among retirees, but rather indirectly, as
a result of the consumption by the retired population (among other goods received from
the state) as in public health, that receives retirement money but does not produce GDP.
3.6.  Savings and direct taxes
The rapid progression of family taxes in the most recent decades is considered,
also, as one of the determinant factors in the fall in savings rates among families in the
majority of western countries.
In Spain, the increase in fiscal pressure (income and family wealth taxes)
expressed as a percentage of available gross family income has gone parallel to the fall
in the family gross savings rate, above all in recent years (Argandoña, 1995).1
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Finally, Attanasio and Banks (1998) find little evidence for the assertion that tax
incentives to promote national saving are needed now to stave off a future drought in
household saving.
3.7.  Savings and spending on lasting consumption goods
The restoration of stock in lasting consumer goods in Spain, after 1985, should
have contributed to reducing the gross family savings the years immediately following.
Given that the renovation of this stock was very slow during the period of
economic stagnancy, an accumulation of purchases could have been produced. These
could be called postponed purchases, which are created when the economy began its
recuperation at the beginning of the 1990s.
4. Altruism explanations: the development of the Welfare State and the
influence of the familiar values
We have seen different reasons that could explain the fall in savings. Surely all of
them play an important role in explaining the fall in savings. But given the complexity
of savings, none of them are sufficient to completely explain the evolution of household
savings. The Altruism Model presents two additional explanations.
First, the development of the Welfare State, by way of an always more generous
social security and growing transfers in all social areas, has been able to create a
paternal vision of the State. In this way, the common conscience is raised to think that
in facing any problem, the State and the Public System is always there: unemployment
insurance, medical care, education, subsidies for companies and sectors, etc.
This situation has been able to affect previsional savings, precautionary savings
and the dynastic model, to confide before the appearance of any problem, in the State,
more than in one’s own capacities and help from one’s family.
This situation is certainly turning out to be unreasonable as the current loan levels
do not appear to be able to continue in the future. Just as Kotlikoff (1992) shows, one
must make others conscious to the fact that future generations are those who will have
to face the problem of maintaining a Welfare State which is impossible to sustain at this
time in the current terms.
Second, from the altruism theory, the loss of family ties or links could have
seriously and profoundly affected the savings rate.
On one hand, the savings value in a current society has been impaired by the ideas
of consumption and the Keynesian inspiration to consume. But it is not only that
savings has been lost, but thanks to Keynes, its social and personal value has been lost
just as the sense of savings itself.1
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Within modern families, in those which the number of children has substantially
decreased, with a generalised increase in divorce which generate a profound instability
in family institution, as demonstrated by Buchanan (1994) narrow familiar links.
Table 7. Relation between savings rates in USA and Japan, according to the
familiar structure (in percentage)
Familiar structure United States Japan
Retirees in family 20 63
Retirees without family 70 27
Savings rates 3,2 12
Source: Garriga (1998).
This can be explained, for example, by the fact that  savings rates in Japan are so
high:  the family is the core of Japanese society, parents live with their children, etc., as
it is shown in Table 8, where it is compared Japan to USA.
Therefore, family dissolution could have a significant negative impact on saving,
because the family dissolution can explain the loss of importance of altruistic motive.
Table 7 and 8 is a good example of the impact of familiar links in the savings rates.
Table 8. Households' consumption rates in Spain (with and without grandparents)
Years 1985 1989
Grandparents With Without With Without
Total households 0,9282 1,0377 0,8968 0,9788
Source: Patxot (1994).
5. Saving, convergence and consequences in Regional Policy
First, I would like to present evidence of the importance of convergence in terms
of the european integration. Second, it is inevitable to indicate the actual situation of the
convergence in Europe, particularly in terms of regions and in terms of spanish
economy. Finally, it is pointed out the necessity of the larger economic growth in order
to improve the convergence and for this, it is necessary the increase of the savings rates
in some regions and countries, particularly in Spain.
5.1. Importance of convergence in the european integration
Since it was adopted the Single Act in 1987 and was signatured the Maastrich
Treat, the cohesion policy has become into one of the three pillars in the european
integration. In this context, the Cohesion Funds and Structural Funds were established1
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in order to avoid the inequalities among the european countries, with great amount of
money.
In period 1989-1993 were utilised more than 68.000 millions of ecus. For the
period 1994-1999 were established 152.000 millions of ecus as Structural Funds.
Besides, the Cohesion Funds have established 14.5 millions of ecus to Spain, Ireland,
Portugal and Greece. Nevertheless, in the next years, the funds will be reduced in order
to prepare the accession to EU of the western countries.
Nowadays, the european countries and regions do not have many instruments in
their economics policies. The monetary policy is one for all the E.U., and the fiscal
policy is strongly limited by the Estability Agreement. Then, what can we do when the
countries and the regions suffer asimetrics shocks? In order to avoid this risk, the
european countries have pay special attention to the convergence, not only in nominal
terms but also in real terms. This attention has important consequences in terms of
Regional Policy, in the context of the convergence among regions and countries.
The nominal convergence was established in the Maastricht Treat. According to
the Treat, in order to be allowed to belong to the monetary union, it was compulsory to
fulfil five criteria: interest rates, price stability or inflation, public debt and so on.
Finally, 11 countries were allowed to belong to the monetary union.
Anyway, in this context it is essential to get the real convergence(2), related to the
development rates (GDP per head, unemployment, etc.).
5.2. The situation in terms of convergence in Europe
There are striking disparities in economic performance between different parts of
Europe, particularly between the central and peripheral regions, in spite of the effort in
Regional Policy for cohesion in the E.U. (Cohesion and Structural Funds). Although the
analysis here presented is among the european countries and no in terms of regions, it is
inevitable to say that the GDP per head (measured in terms of purchasing power
standards, PPS) is typically half to two-thirds of the E.U. average in the Southern
periphery (including the Southern and Western Spain) and around 60% of the E.U.
average in most of Eastern Germany.
In 1986, the year of the accession to the E.U. of Spain and Portugal, the four
cohesion countries (besides Spain and Portugal, are Ireland and Greece)  had a
combined GDP per head, in PPS terms, of around 65% of the E.U. average. Over the
next years, growth in the four was higher than that in the rest of the Union and by 1996,
their GDP per head had risen to 76.5% of the E.U. average, an increase of around 10
percentage points over the decade. Then, the Regional Policy of cohesion in the four
countries could be described as positive.
If we analyse this process of convergence during this period, 1986-1996,
following E.U. (1999), we can see that this convergence has been strongly dependent on1
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the economic climate. The cohesion countries outperformed the E.U. average in the
boom years of 1986 to 1990. During the recession convergence was stopped. Since
1995, with recovery, the gag has begun to narrow again and forecasts for 1999 suggest
that GDP per head in Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece has risen to 79% of the E.U.
average.
Nevertheless, the gap in GDP per head remains wide despite the progress made.
Significant disparities continue and convergence remains a long-term process. For
example, nearly 20% of people in the E.U. still live in regions with output per head 25%
or more below the E.U. average. By comparison, following E.U. (1999), just 2% of
people in the USA are in similar position.
Also, the regional differences has decreased less than national differences, when
the GDP per head of the poorest 25 regions is the 55% of the E.U. average, with three
spanish regions in this situation (Extremadura, Galicia and Andalucia). Recently,
Villaverde (2000) has pointed out that the regional differences in Europe has not
decreased from 1986 to 1997.
Focusing in the spanish situation, in spite of the european funds, the internal
disparities do not seem to decrease, with only three regions in similar levels with
Europe, Madrid, Cataluña and Baleares. The Table 9 presents the real convergence in
the spanish regions.
Table 9. Real convergence in the spanish regions in terms of GDP per head (E.U.
average = 100)
CC.AA. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Andalucía 56,21 56,69 57,17 58,32 69,73
Aragón 89,15 89,33 90,34 93,28 94,75
Asturias 67,19 66,41 66,59 67,09 67,98
Baleares 114,02 112,71 112,93 114,36 119,12
Canarias 78,60 79,89 79,91 80,44 82,18
Cantabria 73,24 73,06 73,69 75,38 76,51
Cast.Mancha 68,51 68,53 68,82 69,94 71,12
Cast. y León 73,25 73,98 74,77 77,27 78,26
Cataluña 92,60 92,39 93,07 94,47 95,89
C. Valencia. 80,84 80,93 81,53 82,61 84,47
Extremadura 58,45 58,51 59,21 60,31 62,45
Galicia 67,75 68,22 68,87 70,06 71,19
Madrid 104,38 105,30 105,99 107,72 110,72
Murcia 68,06 67,95 68,08 68,46 69,51
Navarra 89,95 89,77 89,69 91,77 92,541
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País Vasco 83,97 84,31 85,22 86,84 88,28
La Rioja 97,81 98,38 98,57 100,26 100,96
Ceuta 65,42 64,91 64,02 63,75 64,98
Melilla 65,78 65,32 64,78 64,55 65,12
España 79,17 79,46 80,05 81,45 83,14
Source: Alcaide y Alcaide (2000).
In terms of national level, Spain has experienced relatively high growth since
1986, GDP per head increasing from 70% of the E.U. average in 1986 to 79% in 1996.
Recession hit particularly hard in 1993, GDP being lower in 1994 than two years
earlier. Despite the recession, growth has been above average since then and GDP per
head is projected to increase to 80 of the E.U. average in 1999 (E.U., 1999).
Following Alcaide and Alcaide (2000), in 1997 the GDP per head was 80,05% of
the E.U. average, in 1998, 81,45%, and in 1999, 83,14%, with a growth rate of 4,25%,
greater than the E.U. average, 1,9%.
Nevertheless, this process of real convergence has not been continuos, following a
cycle. In 1960 the GDP per head was 60,2% of the E.U. average, and in 1999 has been
82-83%. But if we compare the situation in 1975 and in 1999, as it is presented in
Graph 1, the convergence has not been very important.
Graph 1. Evolution of real convergence 






































































Source: Author's elaboration following E.U. (1999) and Bank of Spain (1999) following Eurostat, 
calculations DGXVI, EUR15= 100.1
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If we compare the process of convergence in Europe following the pattern of
unemployment, the differences among regions and countries are greater. In general,
unemployment rates differ strikingly between regions. Following E.U. (1999), in parts
of the South, i.e. Spain, Italy and France, unemployment rates of 20-30% are prevalent,
higher than anywhere else in the Union. Another example, in the 10 worst affected
regions, average unemployment was 28.1% in 1997, 8 times higher than in the least
affected regions, where the average was just 3.6%.
Spain is a special case because unemployment in Spain is the highest in the
Union, affecting nearly 1 in 5 of the labour force. Nevertheless, it is important to point
out that there are huge disparities across the country. Following E.U. (1999), the rate in
the Northern regions of Navarra, La Rioja and Aragón ranging between 10% and 15%,
similar to many regions elsewhere in the E.U.. In the Southern regions of Andalucía and
Extremadura, it was around 30%. More over, the real problem, in terms of convergence
and economic growth are the low activity rate in Spain, suggesting a large underused
pool of labour.
Apart from the GDP per head and the unemployment, the convergence can be
studied analysing human and technological capital, and expenditure in social security
and protection.
Human capital can be defined as the percentage of potential active population
(from 15 to 64 years old) who have the university degree. Since 1986 to 1996 this
indicator has increase from 58% to  64% of the E.U. average.
Capital stock presents a great disparity in Spain compared to the E.U. average. In
1996, it was only the 34%. Finally, the last indicator is the percentage of expenditure in
social security and protection. In contrast with the pattern of unemployment and human
stock, and similar to  GDP per head, in this indicator it is observed a clear convergence
to the E.U. average: from 74% in 1986 to 82% in 1996.1
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     Table 10. GDP per head and unemployment by Member State
Member State GDP per head (PPS) Unemployment          (% labour
force)
1986 1996 1986 1996 March,
2000
B 102.8 112.1 11.0 8.9 8,5
DK 112.1 119.3 5.8 5.7 4,8
D(1) 116.1 118.5 6.3 7.9 8,4
EL 59.2 67.5 7.4 9.6 --
E 69.8 78.7 20.8 21.1 14,9
F 109.8 103.9 10.3 12.0 10,2
IRL 60.8 96.5 18.1 10.1 5
I 100.4 102.7 10.2 12.3 --
L 137.3 168.5 2.5 2.5 2,2
NL 101.8 106.8 9.9 5.2 2,8
A 103.2 112.3 3.8 4.4 3,4
P 55.1 70.5 7.0 6.7 4,1
FIN 99.7 96.9 5.2 14.8 10,6
S 111.5 101.2 2.5 10.4 6,5
UK 98.6 99.8 11.0 7.1 --
EUR15 100.0 100.0 10.5 10.7 8,7
(1) Excluding new Länder. Source: E.U. (1999), following Eurostat and calculation DGXVI.A4.
To sum up, and after analysing the five convergence indicators, we can point out
that Spain has keep narrowing the gap with E.U. in terms of real convergence.
Nevertheless, the gap remains wide despite the progress made, particularly in terms of
unemployment rates and human and capital stock.
5.3. The necessity of a larger economic growth to allow the convergence
The stylised fact, that convergence occurs at a more rapid rate during periods of
economic growth and closer integration, is a simple yet powerful observation. And also,
the necessity of a wide period of time in order to advance in convergence is another
powerful observation. For example, in the spanish case, and with a differential growth
of 0.8 points, it will be necessary more than 35 years to get the same economic
development as the european citizens have.(3)1
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More over, this is real observation when it should be waited a huge reduction of
Cohesion Funds between the european countries in the next years meanwhile the
emphasis is made in the new western members countries.
Anyway, if Spain wants to reduce the disparities between the spanish regions and
the european regions, it should absolutely necessary a faster economic growth. We need
to growth more quickly than the rest of european countries. Until now, this necessity
has become into reality, but what can occur in the future?
In order to maintain a greater economic growth rate, we will need higher savings
rates than european savings rates. But this implication, unfortunately, is not a reality in
Spain. For example, since 1995 the national savings were not enough to allow
investment in Spain and it was compulsory to go to international savings markets.(4)
As Valle (1997) presents in Table 11, we can see the necessity of additional
savings in Spain in order to converge to E.U..
Table 11. Spanish convergence to E.U.









(1) Shows the number of years to converge to E.U., based in the situation in 1996 (76.7% GDP per head with respect
to the E.U. average.
(2) Indicates the differential economic growth in percentile terms in respect of the E.U. average growth.
(3) Indicates the increment in savings rate in order to guarantee the differential growth to converge to E.U..
Source: Valle (1997).
In order words, we need to save more than the E.U. average, and this fact, in this
moment, does not happen, particularly if we consider household savings. As we have
seen in the section 2, if decline in savings rates in Spain is a reality, process of
convergence to E.U. could be in danger in order to maintain the capital accumulation
rate similar to Portugal or Ireland. In Table 12, we can observe that differences between
the E.U. average savings rate are not very different to Spain average.1
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Table 12. Private savings rate (in percentage of GDP) in E.U.
Years E.U.-15 Spain Germany France Italy U. K. USA
1994 21.1 20.5 19.8 21.1 24.3 17.7 15.5
1995 21.8 24.2 21.3 21.3 24.9 16.9 17.0
1996 21.1 22.7 21.4 19.7 24.5 16.4 16.6
Source: Author's elaboration from Carbó and Rodríguez (1998)
6. Conclusions
In the course of the last three decades the national saving to income ratio has
undergone profound changes, especially among the industrialised countries. These
changes have tended to run in the same direction for all countries, namely down.
Special attention is paid to the spanish situation, with a great decrease of the household
savings rates.
Saving theories have tried to explain this fact, pointing out possible solutions.
Almost all the solutions have been provided by the so-called Life Cycle Hypothesis,
rather than the altruism model: social security effects, the fact that the relative size of
the retired population is climbing, the recent inflation experience, financial market
development and an easier access to credit, an increase in quick fiscality, a rise in the
unemployment rate, etc.
Nonetheless, it cannot be forgotten the altruism model. The high divorce rate and
closely linked rise in the number of marriages, the substantial decline in the number of
children, and the and the increase in the number of retirement homes have contributed
to family dissolution, which has a significant negative impact on saving.
In addition, the existence of a Social Welfare State, with the slogan "from the
cradle to  the grave", leads people to reduce the amount they would have saved in order
to guarantee a minimum consumption during retirement. Similarly, with a generous
social security system, money to cover oneself in any contingency is reduced.
The analysis of the decline in savings rates is very important in terms of growth,
inversion and real convergence. The more prolonged will be the decrease in savings
rates, the more difficult will be to converge to the E.U. average.
This analysis is particularly important in a context of the regional and national
differences in Europe. Nowadays, there are important differences among regions in E.U.
and in Spain, and in this context is important to maintain Regional Policy in order to
increase the process of the real convergence, particularly when the extension to the East
is a reality in the next years.1
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7. Footnotes
(1) The decline in savings in the United States has been associated with an equally decline in
domestic investment. Since 1990, net domestic investment has averaged 3.6% per year, compared with
8.2% in the 1950s, 7.9% in the 1960s and 1970s, and 6.1% in the 1980s. See Gokhale et al. (1996).
(2) It is necessary to point out that there is no consent about what is the meaning of real
convergence. Normally, the real convergence, following Villaverde and Sánchez-Robles (1998), can be
divided into sigma-convergence and beta-convergence.
(3) The spanish government, according to the Program of Convergence, the period of time to reach
GDP per head of the european countries has been estimated in 55 years.
(4) Also, another problem is the less importance of household savings in percentile terms into the
national savings in Spain. In period 1986-1996, household savings was 40% of national savings,
meanwhile in Europe was 55%.
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